Customer-supplier relationships and corporate tax avoidance by CEN, Ling et al.
Singapore Management University
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
Research Collection School Of Accountancy School of Accountancy
1-2017





Singapore Management University, ldzhang@smu.edu.sg
Luo ZUO
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2016.09.009
Follow this and additional works at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soa_research
Part of the Accounting Commons, and the Corporate Finance Commons
This Journal Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Accountancy at Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management
University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Research Collection School Of Accountancy by an authorized administrator of Institutional
Knowledge at Singapore Management University. For more information, please email libIR@smu.edu.sg.
Citation
CEN, Ling; MAYDEW, Edward L.; ZHANG, Liandong; and ZUO, Luo. Customer-supplier relationships and corporate tax avoidance.
(2017). Journal of Financial Economics. 123, (2), 377-394. Research Collection School Of Accountancy.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soa_research/1703
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2442063 
 
Customer-supplier relationships and corporate tax avoidance* 
 
Ling Cena, Edward L. Maydewb, Liandong Zhangc, Luo Zuod 
a Department of Management (UTSc) and Rotman School of Management, University of Toronto, Toronto, ON 
M5S 3E6, Canada 
b Kenan-Flagler Business School, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, NC 27599, United States 
c Department of Accountancy, City University of Hong Kong, Tat Chee Avenue, Kowloon, Hong Kong 
d Samuel Curtis Johnson Graduate School of Management, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY 14853, United States 
 
Journal of Financial Economics, Forthcoming 
September 12, 2016 
 
ABSTRACT 
We investigate whether firms in close customer-supplier relationships are better able to identify 
and implement tax avoidance strategies via supply chains. Consistent with our prediction, we 
find that both principal customers and their dependent suppliers avoid more taxes than other 
firms. Further analysis suggests that principal customers and dependent suppliers likely engage 
in tax strategies involving shifting profits to tax haven subsidiaries. Moreover, tax benefits 
appear to explain both principal customer firms’ and dependent supplier firms’ organizational 
decisions. Overall, our study provides evidence of the importance of tax avoidance as a source of 
gains from these relationships. 
JEL Classification: H25, H26, L14 
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The role of taxes in financial decision-making has a long history in corporate finance, 
dating back at least to Modigliani and Miller (1963) and continuing to the present day (see 
Graham, 2013, for a review). Besides a deep body of research on the role of taxes in capital 
structure (e.g., DeAngelo and Masulis, 1980; Myers, 1984; Graham, 1996a; van Binsbergen, 
Graham, and Yang, 2010), previous studies have examined the role of taxes in a wide range of 
corporate decisions, including internal capital markets (Desai, Foley, and Hines, 2004), cash 
holdings (Foley, Hartzell, Titman, and Twite, 2007), leasing (Graham, Lemmon, and Schallheim, 
1998), management buyouts (Kaplan, 1989), hedging (Graham and Rogers, 2001), and risk-
taking (Ljungqvist, Zhang, and Zuo, 2015). A theme that runs through most of the research on 
taxes in corporate finance is that the tax incentives in question affect and are affected by the 
firm’s relationships with other parties (Scholes, Wolfson, Erickson, Hanlon, Maydew, and 
Shevlin, 2014). 
Recently, tax avoidance via the supply chain has captured the attention of policy makers, 
as evidenced by Senate hearings involving Caterpillar (U.S. Senate, 2014).1 According to the 
Senate report, Caterpillar was able to reduce its U.S. taxes by $2.4 billion by tax planning related 
to its supply chain. The Caterpillar case received extensive media coverage in the popular press 
such as The Wall Street Journal, Financial Times, and Reuters.2 Despite the growing public 
attention to the economic dynamics between tax avoidance and supply-chain organizations, 
research on this topic has been noticeably absent in the finance literature. To fill this gap, this 
                                                          
1 Following prior research, we use the term “tax avoidance” to refer to the reduction of a firm’s taxes relative to 
its pre-tax income, with no connotation of anything improper or illegal. 
2 See, for example, Hagerty (2014a, b, c, d, 2015a, b), Hagerty and McKinnon (2014), Munshi and Houlder 
(2014), and Temple-West (2014). We provide a detailed discussion of Caterpillar’s Swiss tax strategy in Section 2. 
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study examines whether close customer-supplier relationships facilitate tax planning and whether 
tax incentives affect firms’ organizational decisions. 
In this study, we focus on the relationship between principal customer firms and their 
dependent suppliers, where a significant portion of the dependent suppliers’ sales are derived 
from the purchases by principal customers. Prior industrial organization literature suggests that 
this economically significant relationship is often characterized by relationship-specific 
investments, repeated transactions, and frequent interactions. 3 Therefore, the nature of close 
customer-supplier relationships requires and motivates a high level of coordination between 
customers and suppliers, which enhances investment and operational effectiveness, cost 
efficiency, and innovation (e.g., Cannon and Homburg, 2001; Sobrero and Roberts, 2001; 
Vickery, Jayaram, Droge, and Calantone, 2003). Tax planning strategies, particularly those 
requiring the cooperation of other parties, often involve substantial costs associated with 
information acquisition, negotiation, implementation, and tax compliance documentation 
(Gallemore and Labro, 2015; U.S. Senate, 2014). We argue that firms in significant and close 
customer-supplier relationships have a lower marginal cost in identifying and implementing 
supply-chain-related tax avoidance strategies, because these firms likely have already developed 
more efficient cooperation and information processing mechanisms with their trading partners, 
relative to other firms without close supply-chain relationships. 
Moreover, when a principal customer firm requests cooperative actions by its dependent 
suppliers, such as directing sales to the customer’s tax haven subsidiaries, these suppliers are 
more likely to comply because the potential cost (in the form of losing sales from the principal 
                                                          
3 For example, suppliers may have to reshape their production lines to cater to the needs of customers and 
customers may need to train suppliers to meet their quality requirements. Customers may also need to have regular 
visits to their suppliers’ plants to monitor product quality and inventory sufficiency. In our sample, an average 
customer-supplier relationship lasts for more than three years. 
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customer) of not cooperating are unaffordable, given that the average sales to each principal 
customer represent more than 26% of a typical dependent supplier’s total sales. In addition, 
dependent suppliers themselves can achieve potential tax benefits in their principal customer’s 
tax strategies by, for example, setting up distribution subsidiaries in the tax havens of the 
principal customer’s subsidiaries.4 Similar to the case of product innovations, suppliers may even 
initiate and propose mutually beneficial tax avoidance plans to their customers, such as arranging 
title transfers in zero or low tax locations, and it is more cost-efficient for dependent supplier 
firms than other firms to do so, because it is usually less costly to convince and coordinate with a 
small group of large customers. 
In making tax avoidance decisions, firms trade off the marginal benefits against the 
marginal costs of managing taxes. While the marginal benefits in the form of tax savings are 
similar across firms, the discussions above suggest that firms in close customer-supplier 
relationships, such as Caterpillar and its dependent suppliers, have lower marginal costs of 
implementing a given supply-chain-based tax strategy. Thus, we predict that principal customer 
firms and dependent supplier firms avoid more taxes than firms that are not in close customer-
supplier relationships. 
While the above predictions appear to be intuitive, we do not know whether these supply-
chain relationships play an economically and statistically significant role in tax planning for a 
broad sample of firms. For example, although dependent suppliers may cooperate with their 
principal customers regarding transactions in tax havens, they themselves may not exploit the 
potential for tax avoidance. On the contrary, there is a possibility that dependent suppliers avoid 
less tax because transacting with their linked principal customers (which are likely under 
                                                          
4  Of course, dependent suppliers can set up subsidiaries in a tax haven even if their customers have no 
subsidiaries in the same jurisdiction. However, in this case, it could be more difficult to justify the economic 
substance of such arrangements before the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). 
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continual audit by the IRS) likely exposes them to increased IRS audit risk. Moreover, prior 
literature argues that firms in significant customer-supplier relationships prefer their trading 
partners to take less investment or financial risk because they will have difficulty in redeploying 
their relationship-specific assets and maintaining product and service quality should their 
partners fail (e.g., Titman and Wessels, 1988; Hertzel, Li, Officer, and Rodgers, 2008; Kolay, 
Lemmon, and Tashjian, 2015). According to this argument, we might expect firms in customer-
supplier relationships to avoid less tax because aggressive tax planning can increase reputation or 
distress risk (Hanlon and Slemrod, 2009; Desai and Dharmapala, 2006; Kim, Li, and Zhang, 
2011; Graham, Hanlon, Shevlin, and Shroff, 2014; Heitzman and Ogneva 2016). Given these 
theoretical tensions in the literature, the existence, direction, and economic magnitude of the 
impact of customer-supplier relationships on tax avoidance are therefore empirical issues. 
In our empirical analysis, we define a firm as a principal customer if the firm is reported 
as a principal customer by at least one firm. A firm is a dependent supplier if the firm reports at 
least one principal customer in a specific year.5 Our results show that both principal customers 
and dependent suppliers avoid significantly more taxes than other firms: The average principal 
customer in our sample has a 1.0% lower effective tax rate calculated using Generally Accepted 
Accounting Principles (GAAP ETR) and a 2.7% lower cash effective tax rate (CASH ETR) than 
other firms; and the average dependent supplier has a 0.8% lower GAAP ETR and a 1.4% lower 
CASH ETR than other firms. These results are all statistically and economically significant. 
We next examine a specific mechanism by which customer-supplier relationships could 
facilitate tax avoidance. According to the Senate investigation of Caterpillar (U.S. Senate, 2014) 
and articles in the tax practitioner literature (e.g., Gilson, Wells, Feinberg, and Newman, 2014), 
                                                          
5 It is rare for a given firm to be both a principal customer and a dependent supplier, as only 3% of firm-year 
observations are simultaneously classified as principal customer and dependent supplier firms. 
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principal customers and dependent suppliers are able to implement supply-chain strategies that 
shift income to subsidiaries in low-tax jurisdictions.6 Consistent with this prediction, we find that 
principal customer and dependent supplier firms with tax haven subsidiaries have significantly 
lower GAAP ETRs and CASH ETRs than other firms, even those that also have tax haven 
subsidiaries. Moreover, principal customer (dependent supplier) firms with tax haven 
subsidiaries also appear to have lower GAAP ETRs and CASH ETRs than principal customer 
(dependent supplier) firms without tax haven subsidiaries, though the differences are not always 
significant. Finally, it appears that tax avoidance is greatest among suppliers that have both a tax 
haven subsidiary and a principal customer that also has a tax haven subsidiary. 
Our primary findings suggest that close customer-supplier relationships facilitate tax 
avoidance strategies involving supply chains. A natural follow-up question is whether tax 
incentives affect these firms’ organizational structures. We find that principal customers with 
higher marginal tax rates are more likely to subsequently establish subsidiaries in tax havens than 
principal customers with lower marginal tax rates, and that this effect becomes stronger (weaker) 
after a regulatory shock that facilitates (hinders) tax avoidance arrangements via tax havens. 
Overall, tax incentives seem to motivate firms in these relationships to restructure part of their 
internal organizations. Finally, we show that dependent supplier firms are more likely to set up 
foreign subsidiaries in a country if their principal customers have subsidiaries in the same 
country. More importantly, the colocation effect is more pronounced if foreign subsidiaries of 
customer firms are located in tax havens. 
Our research contributes to the literature in corporate finance from an industrial 
organization perspective. Close customer-supplier relationships act as a substitute for vertical 
                                                          
6 Motivated by the Caterpillar case, we explore a potential mechanism that is more relevant for multinational 
firms. The main results, however, hold for both multinational and domestic-only firms. 
6 
 
integration to reduce agency and transaction costs (Coase, 1937; Granovetter, 1985; Williamson, 
1979). Prior research has examined how a firm’s investment, financing, and disclosure decisions 
are affected by the frictions in these inter-firm relationships. For example, Kale and Shahrur 
(2007) and Banerjee, Dasgupta, and Kim (2008) show that firms in significant customer-supplier 
relationships tend to maintain lower leverage to induce their trade partners to undertake 
relationship-specific investments. 7  Our research extends this literature by focusing on the 
benefits of close customer-supplier relationships in the context of corporate tax planning. We 
show that close customer-supplier relationships are associated with lower effective tax rates, 
even after controlling for the potential effects of vertical integrations. Moreover, we show that 
tax incentives appear to affect how these firms organize their economic activities. 
Our research also contributes to the literature of corporate tax avoidance. Tax avoidance 
is inexorably connected with firms’ other financial decisions (Graham, Lemmon, and Schallheim, 
1998). For example, Graham and Tucker (2006) show that firms engaging in tax shelters have 
less demand for debt in their capital structure, since the tax shelters provide non-debt tax shields. 
A fundamental principle of tax avoidance is that it can rarely be done in isolation (Scholes et al., 
2014). Tax avoidance almost invariably affects or is affected by relationships with other parties 
(Shackelford and Shevlin, 2001). Researchers have examined the influence of several important 
relationships on tax avoidance, including relationships with owners (Chen, Chen, Cheng, and 
Shevlin, 2010; Desai and Dharmapala, 2006), employees (Chyz, Leung, Li, and Rui, 2013), 
joint-venture partners (Shevlin, 1987), potential acquirers (Erickson, 1998), and the government 
(Kim and Zhang, 2016). The role of customer-supplier relationships in tax avoidance is, however, 
for the most part unknown. This gap in the literature is surprising given that most prominent tax 
                                                          
7  Other studies have examined corporate disclosure (Hui, Klasa, and Yeung, 2012; Cen, Chen, Hou, and 
Richardson, 2014), contract design (Costello, 2013), dividend policy (Wang, 2012), mergers and acquisitions (Fee 
and Thomas, 2004; Cen, Dasgupta, and Sen, 2015), and ownership structure (Fee, Hadlock, and Thomas, 2006). 
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advisors, including the Big Four accounting firms (i.e., Ernst & Young, Deloitte Touche 
Tohmatsu, KPMG, and PricewaterhouseCoopers), provide consulting services on tax efficient 
supply-chain management, such as tax haven strategies (Gilson, Wells, Feinberg, and Newman, 
2014). We advance this literature by examining how customer-supplier relationships affect, and 
to a lesser extent, are affected by, tax avoidance. 
The findings of this study are relevant for policymakers, who have expressed concerns 
about such strategies but lack broad empirical evidence about them. For example, the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has recently undertaken a 
major initiative aimed at what it terms “base erosion” in which multinational firms are able to 
shift large amounts of their income into tax haven affiliates (OECD, 2013). Policymakers in the 
U.S. are equally concerned, as illustrated by the U.S. Senate hearings scrutinizing individual 
companies (e.g., U.S. Senate, 2014). By providing rigorous empirical evidence of the influence 
of customer-supplier relationships on tax avoidance, we contribute to a more complete and in-
depth understanding of how tax avoidance takes place and the conditions that give rise to it, both 
of which are necessary precursors to informed policy-making.  
In the next section, we describe Caterpillar’s tax strategy as an example of tax planning 
facilitated by close customer-supplier relationships. Section 3 presents the data and measurement 
of key variables. Section 4 conducts the main empirical analysis, examines potential mechanisms, 





2. Caterpillar’s tax strategy 
Before turning to our empirical tests, it is useful to explore actual tax strategies that firms 
in customer-supplier relationships have a unique advantage in structuring. In this section, we 
discuss the case of Caterpillar Inc. (Caterpillar), drawing mainly on the U.S. Senate report of 
“Caterpillar’s Offshore Tax Strategy.”8 Caterpillar, a multinational corporation headquartered in 
the U.S., is the world’s leading manufacturer of construction and mining equipment, diesel and 
natural gas engines, industrial gas turbines, and diesel-electric locomotives. According to 
Caterpillar’s documents, while the company typically earns a small profit margin from the initial 
sales of its machines, its replacement parts business has a high profit margin and generates 
steady earnings for Caterpillar. The replacement parts are produced primarily by third-party 
suppliers, but carry the Caterpillar brand and are packaged as Caterpillar products. While 
Caterpillar does not own most of its suppliers, it exercises oversight of them to maintain product 
quality and protect its brand. According to the Senate report: 
The company dedicates significant resources to managing its relationships with its third-
party suppliers. The company’s purchasing group, led by Frank Crespo of Mossville, 
Illinois, has been assigned primary responsibility for managing those relationships. The 
purchasing group works closely with the suppliers to ensure they build parts that meet 
Caterpillar’s quality standards and price requirements (U.S. Senate, 2014: 35).  
 
Around 1998, Caterpillar began to implement a supply-chain tax strategy designed by 
PricewaterhouseCoopers.9 As part of the strategy, Caterpillar consolidated several purchasing 
entities into a single Swiss subsidiary, known as Caterpillar SARL (CSARL). CSARL was to act 
as the global purchaser of Caterpillar replacement parts. After the implementation of the supply-
chain tax strategy, Caterpillar’s third-party suppliers sold Caterpillar brand replacement parts 
                                                          
8 This section provides a high level overview for illustration only. Details can be found in the Senate report 
available at: http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/download/report-caterpillars-offshore-tax-strategy-april-1-2014. 
9 PricewaterhouseCoopers was paid $55 million for developing and implementing the supply-chain tax strategy 
for Caterpillar.  
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directly to CSARL, which then sold them to Caterpillar or Caterpillar’s non-U.S. dealers (Fig. 1). 
For the sales of replacement parts to non-U.S. dealers, the strategy resulted in much of the 
income being attributed to CSARL, and thus subject to tax in Switzerland at a much lower rate 
than in the U.S.10 There are reportedly many variations on this strategy in existence, but the 
general idea is to make the subsidiary in the low-tax jurisdiction be responsible for high-value 
activities and be the residual claimant within the firm. In most cases, the goods do not physically 
travel through the tax haven. 
The third-party suppliers play an important role in Caterpillar’s supply-chain tax strategy: 
They have to work with CSARL in the financial transaction (i.e., contracts and invoicing are 
with CSARL) and with Caterpillar in the product transaction (i.e., the product quality and 
physical inventory delivery are monitored by Caterpillar under a service agreement between 
CSARL and Caterpillar).11 Therefore, the implementation of this strategy required a high level of 
coordination between Caterpillar and its third-party suppliers.12 At the same time, Caterpillar’s 
tax strategy depended on its suppliers not being vertically integrated under common ownership. 
While the strategy reduced the taxes on profits from parts acquired from third-party suppliers, it 
was ineffective for parts manufactured by Caterpillar itself. 13 
According to the Senate report, the supply-chain tax strategy helped Caterpillar shift 85% 
or more of the profits from the replacement parts from the U.S. to Switzerland, where Caterpillar 
                                                          
10 Strictly speaking, this is a deferral strategy. Since the ultimate parent in Caterpillar’s legal structure is a U.S. 
corporation, presumably at some point the income in the Swiss entity will be repatriated to the U.S. parent and 
subject to U.S. taxation. 
11 Although our case study focuses on external transactions of Caterpillar with their dependent suppliers, the 
strategy also involves coordination of internal transactions (transfer pricing). CSARL paid Caterpillar a fee (costs 
plus 5%) in exchange for Caterpillar’s management and sales of replacement parts, including monitoring the third-
party suppliers. 
12 It took Caterpillar five years to fully implement this strategy. 
13 In technical terms, the supply-chain strategy required the use of third-party suppliers and customers to avoid 
the Subpart F provisions of the U.S. tax code. Sales income from parts manufactured by Caterpillar itself continued 
to be taxable in the U.S. even after implementing the strategy (U.S. Senate, 2014, pp. 47–51). 
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had negotiated an effective corporate tax rate between 4% and 6%. The Senate report estimated 
that over the period 2000 to 2012, the supply-chain strategy reduced Caterpillar’s U.S. taxes by 
$2.4 billion. 
3. Data and variable measurement 
3.1. Sample and data sources 
The initial sample includes all firm-year observations in Compustat over the period 1994 
to 2009. We start our sample in 1994 because U.S. public firms have been required to make 
electronic corporate disclosures in the Securities and Exchange Commission’s Electronic Data 
Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval (EDGAR) database since fiscal year 1993. In addition, two 
regulatory events in 1993 likely affect the consistent measurement of our tax variables. First, 
Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 109 (SFAS No. 109), Accounting for Income 
Taxes, changed the accounting for income taxes.14 Second, the U.S. statutory corporate income 
tax rate increased from 34% to 35%. Following prior research (e.g., Chen, Chen, Cheng, and 
Shevlin, 2010; Dyreng, Hanlon, and Maydew, 2016), we remove firm-year observations with 
negative pre-tax income or book value, with non-positive sales, or with total assets of less than 
$1 million.15 Firms from the financial services and utilities industries are also excluded. We then 
drop observations with unavailable information from Compustat in calculating our key tax 
avoidance variables and other control variables. These screening criteria yield a final full sample 
of 42,565 firm-years. Table 1 provides the sample distribution across time (Panel A) and industry 
(Panel B). On average, 12%, 35%, and 56% of Compustat firms are classified as principal 
customer firms, dependent supplier firms, and other Compustat firms, respectively. It is rare for a 
                                                          
14 While our tax avoidance measures based on cash taxes paid are not affected by the accounting change, our 
accounting-based measures, such as GAAP ETRs, are likely affected. 
15 We do not include firm-year observations with negative pre-tax income in our main sample because of the 
need for an interpretable effective tax rate. In robustness tests, we explore alternative definitions of effective tax 
rates that are available for observations with negative pre-tax income. 
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firm to be both a principal customer and a dependent supplier, as only 3% of firm-year 
observations are simultaneously classified as principal customer and dependent supplier firms. 
3.2. Principal customers and dependent suppliers 
Information on customer-supplier relationships is based on the Compustat Segments 
Customer File. This information is publicly available, as SFAS No. 14 (before 1997) and SFAS 
No. 131 (after 1997) require firms (regardless of the number of segments operated) to disclose 
the existence and sales to principal customers representing more than 10% of total firm 
revenues.16 We define a firm as a dependent supplier firm if it reports at least one principal 
corporate customer in that year.17 
The database reports only the name of the principal customers without unique identifiers. 
In many cases, only the abbreviated versions of the names are reported (e.g., “GM” instead of 
“General Motors”), and sometimes the same customer is reported in a different form in different 
years and by different suppliers. Using manual search procedures, we identify and match U.S.-
listed customers to their Compustat identifiers (i.e., GVKEY) and foreign-listed customers to 
their Datastream identifiers (i.e., SEDOL) whenever possible. Using the matched customer ID 
data, we define a Compustat firm as a principal customer firm if the firm is reported as a 
principal customer by at least one other firm.18 
Given the definition of a principal customer, it is not surprising that most principal 
                                                          
16 Some firms temporarily stopped reporting principal customers in 1998 and 1999 since it took time for them to 
adjust their financial reporting after the regulation had changed. Results are robust to dropping observations for 
these two years from our sample. 
17 Our results are qualitatively unchanged if we use 15% or 20% of total sales as the threshold in defining 
principal customers and dependent suppliers.  
18 It is worth noting that the identity of principal customers includes both foreign and domestic firms, as well as 
public and private firms. Thus, the classification of a sample firm as a dependent supplier should be relatively free of 
misclassification. However, foreign and private dependent suppliers are not in the data, which could result in 
misclassification of principal customers that have only foreign or privately held suppliers (i.e., that do not have any 
publicly held U.S. suppliers). This data limitation likely works against finding significant results for principal 
customers because our “other Compustat firms” may include some misclassified principal customers. More 
generally, we caution against generalizing the conclusions beyond U.S. publicly traded firms. 
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customers are large and mature firms with industry leadership, such as Walmart, AT&T, and 
Caterpillar. The median market capitalization of principal customers in our sample is $4.6 billion 
and their median age in Compustat is 19 years.19 The dependent supplier firms are usually much 
smaller and younger than their principal customers. The median market capitalization of 
dependent suppliers in our sample is $112.3 million and their median age in Compustat is ten 
years. The dependent supplier firms are also smaller and younger than firms without important 
customer-supplier relationships (i.e., “other Compustat firms” in our sample), which have a 
median market capitalization of $170.3 million and a median age of 11 years. A dependent 
supplier usually has only one or two principal customers whereas a principal customer, such as 
Walmart and AT&T, can have more than 50 dependent suppliers. 20 Further, for a dependent 
supplier, the average percentage purchase from each principal customer in its total sales is higher 
than 26%. On the other hand, for a principal customer, the average percentage of inputs from 
each individual dependent supplier is less than 1% of the cost of goods sold. As an example, we 
provide a list of dependent suppliers for Caterpillar in Appendix A.  
It is useful to point out that it is relatively rare for a principal customer firm to take a 
partial or full equity stake in its dependent suppliers. Based on the same data set from 1988 to 
2001, Fee, Hadlock, and Thomas (2006) find that significant cross-holding equity stakes are 
present in only 3.31% of all sample relationships.21 In explaining this pattern, they argue that the 
customer-supplier relationships can be effectively governed by explicit and implicit contracts 
                                                          
19 Firm age is measured as the number of years since a firm was initially covered by Compustat.  
20 Note that the data structure is akin to a separate “hub-and-spoke” network topology, where each principal 
customer firm represents a hub and its dependent suppliers represent spokes. There are generally minimal 
intertwinements between different networks (centered on each customer firm) because a dependent supplier usually 
has only one or two principal customers and it is rare for a given firm to be both a principal customer and a 
dependent supplier. 
21 In untabulated tests, we find that it is rare for principal customers to acquire their dependent suppliers, 
consistent with the findings of Fee, Hadlock, and Thomas (2006). We find no evidence that tax incentives motivate 
customer firms to engage in vertical integration, although we think this question is worthy of future research. 
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without the involvement of ownership.  
3.3. Key tax variables and control variables 
Following prior research, we use effective tax rates to measure the overall level of tax 
avoidance. Our first effective tax rate measure is GAAP ETR (denoted by GETR), defined as 
total income tax expense divided by pre-tax book income less special items. GAAP ETR 
captures tax avoidance activities that result in permanent tax savings. However, GAAP ETR 
generally does not capture tax avoidance strategies that defer cash taxes because the reduction in 
current tax expense is offset by an increase in deferred tax expense (Hanlon and Heitzman, 2010; 
McGill and Outslay, 2004). Our second measure, CASH ETRs (denoted by CETR), is defined as 
cash taxes paid divided by pre-tax book income less special items. CASH ETR uses cash taxes 
paid in the numerator and thus captures tax deferral strategies that are not captured in the 
traditional GAAP effective tax rate (Dyreng, Hanlon, and Maydew, 2008). We winsorize both 
effective tax rate measures at zero and one.22  
In our analysis of corporate tax avoidance, empirical comparisons are between companies 
in close customer-supplier relationships (i.e., principal customer firms or dependent supplier 
firms) and those who are not (i.e., other Compustat firms). These other Compustat firms include 
firms whose industry or business models do not tend toward having these kinds of relationships 
as well as vertically integrated firms. Vertical integration offers alternative tax planning 
opportunities via transfer pricing. Accordingly, we include a vertical integration indicator that 
applies to all firms. Specifically, we construct an indicator variable that equals one if a firm has 
two business Segments A and B where the industry of Segment A contributes more than 10% in 
total input for the industry of Segment B according to the input-output tables of the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis (BEA). Note also that some firms disclose the U.S. or a foreign 
                                                          
22 All the results remain quite similar if we truncate effective tax rates at zero and one. 
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governmental organization as their principal customer. We include a government contractor 
indicator to identify those firms. 
We identify several additional control variables following prior literature (e.g., Chen, 
Chen, Cheng, and Shevlin, 2010; Dyreng, Hanlon, and Maydew, 2008; Rego, 2003), including 
return on assets (ROA), financial leverage, foreign assets, new investments, property, plant, and 
equipment, intangible assets, equity income in earnings, firm size, market-to-book ratio, 
abnormal accruals, cash holdings, and Delaware indicator.23 We include ROA to capture firm 
profitability, which can affect the incentives and needs to avoid taxes.24 We include financial 
leverage to capture the effect of the tax shield of debt. Higher debt tax shields can reduce 
marginal tax rates and the incentives for incremental tax planning (Graham, 1996a, b, 2000). We 
include foreign assets as a control because Rego (2003) finds that multinational firms with more 
extensive foreign operations have more opportunities for tax planning. We use new investments, 
property, plant, and equipment, intangible assets, and equity income in earnings to control for the 
effect of a firm’s investment activities on book-tax differences because tax and accounting rules 
are often different for these investments (e.g., Chen, Chen, Cheng, and Shevlin, 2010). We 
control for firm size and book-to-market ratio to capture fundamental firm characteristics 
following most tax avoidance research. Abnormal accruals are included to control for the 
potential effect of earnings management on book-tax differences (e.g., Frank, Lynch, and Rego, 
2009). We also control for cash holdings to capture the incentives of tax planning given that 
firms with more cash can have less need to defer taxes. On the other hand, tax aggressive firms 
                                                          
23 Appendix B provides detailed definitions of all the variables. Following Chen, Chen, Cheng, and Shevlin 
(2010), we measure size and book-to-market at the beginning of the year. 
24 Prior literature also includes loss carryforward and change in loss carryforward to capture firm profitability. 
We do not include these two variables because the underlying measure from Compustat contains large measurement 
errors (as pointed out by the referee). Nevertheless, our inferences are unchanged when we include these two 
variables as additional controls. 
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may hold more cash as a precautionary measure for future settlements with the IRS (e.g., 
Hanlon, Maydew, and Saavedra, 2016). Finally, we include a Delaware incorporation indicator 
because prior research argues that Delaware is a domestic tax haven (e.g., Dyreng, Lindsey, and 
Thornock, 2013). 
3.4. Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 provides the descriptive statistics for our main regression variables. Column 1 of 
Table 2 reports the means of all variables for the full sample. Columns 2 to 4 report the means 
for the principal customers, dependent suppliers, and other Compustat firms, respectively. As 
expected, principal customer firms are generally large and dependent supplier firms are generally 
small firms, relative to other Compustat firms. The mean GAAP ETR for the principal-customer 
sample is slightly higher than that for other-firm sample (31.0% versus 30.2%), and the mean 
CASH ETR for the principal-customer sample is slightly lower than that for other-firm sample 
(25.6% versus 25.8%). On the other hand, the mean GAAP ETR and CASH ETR of dependent 
suppliers are discernibly lower than those of other Compustat firms (27.8% versus 30.2%, and 
23.1% versus 25.8%). While these univariate comparisons can give us some indications of 
differences across firms, we rely on multiple regression analysis for more rigorous evidence. 
4. Research design and empirical results 
4.1. Principal customers, dependent suppliers, and tax avoidance 
To examine the effect of customer-supplier relationships on corporate tax avoidance, we 
estimate the following regression model: 
ETR = β1Principal customer + β2Dependent supplier + ГX + Industry FE +Year FE + ε,       (1) 
where ETR is our (inverse) measure of tax avoidance (i.e., GAAP ETR or CASH ETR); 
Principal customer is an indicator that takes the value of one if the firm is a principal customer 
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firm; Dependent supplier is an indicator that takes the value of one if the firm is a dependent 
supplier firm. The vector X represents the set of control variables as discussed in Section 3. In all 
regressions, we control for year and industry fixed effects.25 We predict both β1 and β2 to be 
significantly negative, i.e., both principal customer firms and dependent supplier firms avoid 
more taxes than other Compustat firms. 
Table 3 presents the main regression results. The t-statistics are based on standard errors 
adjusted for clustering on both firm and year levels. Columns 1 and 2 show that principal 
customer firms have lower GAAP and CASH ETRs (1.0% and 2.7%, respectively) than other 
Compustat firms. These statistically and economically significant results (representing 3.4% 
(10.8%) of the mean GAAP (CASH) ETR of the full sample) suggest that principal customer 
firms avoid significantly more taxes relative to other Compustat firms. As seen from columns 1 
and 2, dependent supplier firms also have significantly lower GAAP and cash effective tax rates 
than other Compustat firms. Specifically, the average GAAP (CASH) ETR of dependent supplier 
firms is 0.8% (1.4%) lower than that of other Compustat firms, which are also economically 
significant.  
Regarding the control variables, the coefficient on Vertical integration is generally large 
and negative, which may indicate that vertically integrated firms have more opportunities to 
avoid taxes than other firms. Statistically, however, the effect is only marginally significant in the 
GAAP ETR regression and it is insignificant in the CASH ETR regression. The coefficient on 
Government contractor is economically small and statistically insignificant in both columns 1 
and 2. The coefficients on other control variables are generally consistent with prior research.26 
                                                          
25 The limited within-firm variations in our independent variables of interest prevent us from including firm 
fixed effects in the regression.  
26 In our main tests we use all other Compustat firms as the control sample. To further examine the robustness of 
our main results, we use propensity score matched control samples to re-examine our hypothesis and find that all the 
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4.2. Alternative measures of tax avoidance 
Following prior research, we use several alternative effective tax rates to measure the 
overall level of tax avoidance. Dyreng, Hanlon, and Maydew (2008) point out that the annual 
CASH ETR measure can suffer from a so-called mismatch problem. That is, the numerator in the 
CASH ETR formula can include taxes paid on earnings in a different period. To alleviate this 
problem, Dyreng, Hanlon, and Maydew (2008) develop a long-run CASH ETR measure. 
Following Dyreng, Hanlon, and Maydew (2008), we define a long-run CASH ETR (denoted by 
CETR5) as the sum of cash taxes paid over five years (t to t+4) divided by the sum of pre-tax 
income adjusted for special items over the same accumulation period.27 
Both GAAP ETR and CASH ETR measures capture non-conforming tax avoidance but 
not conforming avoidance. Conforming tax avoidance occurs when a firm lowers its taxes by 
reducing both taxable income and pre-tax accounting income. It is possible that firms in a close 
customer-supplier relationship can also use conforming tax avoidance strategies. As a result, 
GAAP ETR or CASH ETR measures could have a limitation in capturing the overall level of tax 
avoidance of these firms. To address this concern, we use a cash effective tax rate measure 
(denoted by CASH RATIO) that uses operating cash flows as the denominator. Specifically, the 
CASH RATIO measure is defined as cash taxes paid divided by pre-tax operating cash flows 
adjusted for extraordinary items and discontinued operations. We winsorize both CETR5 and 
CASH RATIO at zero and one. The results in columns 1 to 2 of Table 4 show that our main 
findings are robust to these alternative effective tax rate measures. 
Our GETR and CETR measures require the denominator (i.e., pre-tax income) to be 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
main results remain qualitatively unchanged. Further, the magnitude and statistical significance of the coefficients 
on Principal customer and Dependent supplier remain similar if we exclude vertically integrated firms or 
government contractors (or both). We also estimate the regression with only a minimal set of controls (i.e., Firm size) 
and find similar results (untabulated).  
27 In calculating tax rates in this section, we do not require firm-year observations to have positive pre-tax 
income at the individual year level, except for current effective tax rates. 
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positive and we thus remove firm-year observations with negative pre-tax income, which may 
lead to bias. The long-run CASH ETR measure suffers less from this problem since negative 
earnings are less common over longer periods of time. The long-run measure, however, requires 
five years of data for each firm, reducing sample size. To further test the robustness of our results, 
we use a cash tax differential (CTD) measure developed by Henry and Sansing (2014), which is 
estimated as the difference between cash taxes paid and the product of statutory tax rate and pre-
tax income, scaled by lagged total assets. Column 3 of Table 4 shows that our main results 
continue to hold based on the CTD measure.  
Finally, GAAP ETRs include deferred tax expenses caused by the differences between 
book and tax accrual accounting. To capture current taxes owed to the tax authorities, we also 
estimate effective tax rates using current tax expenses. Column 4 shows that the main results are 
robust to current effective tax rates. 
4.3. Relationship establishment and tax avoidance 
 To partially alleviate potential endogeneity concerns, we use an event study to examine 
the impact of customer-supplier relationships on suppliers’ tax avoidance. 28 Specifically, we 
investigate the impact of relationship establishment events on the effective tax rates of dependent 
suppliers. Note, however, that it is impractical to examine the effect of relationship 
establishments on a customer’s tax avoidance because principal customers generally have many 
dependent suppliers and thus the marginal effect of adding one more supplier is tiny. 
Relationship establishment is defined as when a firm reports a principal customer in year t for the 
first time where the relationship will last for at least three years (i.e., years t, t+1, and t+2).29 
                                                          
28 Our results are also robust to an instrumental variable approach, in which we use the percentage of principal 
customer firms and dependent supplier firms, respectively, within a firm’s industry as instruments for principal 
customer and dependent supplier variables. 
29 One caveat is that it is not necessarily a new relationship, just one that crosses the threshold for disclosure. 
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Untabulated results suggest that, in a five-year period around the relationship establishment with 
principal customers, the GAAP ETRs and CASH ETRs of dependent suppliers decrease by 2.9% 
and 2.4% from year t–2 to year t+2. Moreover, the reduction of effective tax rates mainly 
happens in year t+1 and year t+2 instead of year t, suggesting that it takes time for firms to 
implement supply-chain tax strategies. Using a difference-in-differences method, we find that the 
results are not driven by common industry trends or common factors that affect firms with 
similar size or similar tax rates before the relationship establishment. 
4.4. Tax haven strategy as a tax avoidance mechanism 
While there are many tax strategies that firms can use to reduce their effective tax rates, 
we empirically test a potential mechanism that is likely to be attractive to companies in close 
customer-supplier relationships: establishing subsidiaries in tax havens. By shifting part of their 
corporate profits to offshore subsidiaries incorporated in tax havens, as in the case of Caterpillar, 
companies can substantially reduce their U.S. tax burdens. It is important to note that this tax 
haven strategy relies on coordination of both internal and external transactions. It relies on 
internal transactions (and thus transfer pricing) in that it involves attributing some of the firm’s 
profits to its tax haven subsidiary. That requires internal coordination between the tax haven 
subsidiary and the parent’s other subsidiaries. However, implementing the strategy also requires 
coordination with external parties (i.e., external suppliers or customers have to deal with this new 
entity from a tax haven), which distinguishes principal customer and dependent supplier firms 
from other firms. 
 Table 5 reports the results when we classify principal customers and dependent suppliers 
into different types based on whether the firm has at least one subsidiary in a tax haven, as 
defined by Dyreng and Lindsey (2009). 46.6% of principal customer firms, 27.0% of dependent 
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supplier firms, and 22.6% of other firms have at least one tax haven subsidiary. We include an 
indicator variable, Tax haven subs, which takes on a value of one for any firm with a tax haven 
subsidiary, to isolate the incremental tax savings of a tax haven subsidiary for principal 
customers or dependent suppliers compared to other firms. Column 1 of Table 5 shows that both 
principal customers with tax haven subsidiaries and dependent suppliers with tax haven 
subsidiaries have lower GAAP ETRs than other Compustat firms (2.4% and 0.8%, respectively, 
and significant at the 1% level). Similarly, column 3 shows that both types of firms also have 
lower CASH ETRs than other Compustat firms (4.4% and 1.7%, respectively, and both 
statistically significant at the 1% level). In addition, principal customers (dependent suppliers) 
with tax haven subsidiaries have lower GAAP and CASH ETRs than principal customers 
(dependent suppliers) without tax haven subsidiaries. 
Columns 2 and 4 report the results when we further classify dependent suppliers into four 
types based on whether they have subsidiaries in tax havens and whether their linked principal 
customers have subsidiaries in tax havens: (i) 9.2% of supplier firms have tax haven subsidiaries 
and at the same time their linked principal customers also have tax haven subsidiaries; (ii) 16.5% 
of supplier firms have tax haven subsidiaries but their principal customers have no tax haven 
subsidiaries; (iii) 18.6% of supplier firms have no tax haven subsidiaries but their linked 
principal customers have tax haven subsidiaries; and (iv) 55.7% of supplier firms have no tax 
haven subsidiaries and their linked principal customers have no subsidiaries in tax havens either. 
We find that the first type of supplier firms have the lowest GAAP and CASH ETRs among the 
four types of supplier firms. Specifically, for this type of supplier firms, the GAAP ETR (CASH 
ETR) is 1.2% (2.4%) lower than that for other Compustat firms, and the difference is statistically 
significant at the 1% level. This result is consistent with the notion that suppliers can avoid taxes 
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themselves by working with principal customers that adopt tax haven strategies.  
The coefficient of Tax haven subs is not statistically significant across the board, 
consistent with the notion that coordination with external parties (principal customers or 
dependent suppliers) is important in implementing tax haven strategies. Overall, the results in 
Table 5 are consistent with the utilization of tax haven subsidiaries as one of the mechanisms 
through which customer and supplier firms reduce their corporate taxes.30 
4.5. Tax incentives and organizational structure 
A large body of corporate finance literature suggests that tax benefits help to explain the 
choice of leverage, dividend policy, or organizational form (Graham, 2003, 2006, 2013). For 
example, using the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis’ data, Desai, Foley, and Hines (2004) 
show that multinational firms respond opportunistically to cross-country differences in taxes 
such that their net internal debt infusion into foreign subsidiaries increases with foreign tax rates. 
Extending this literature, we next examine whether tax incentives help to explain how customer 
and supplier firms organize themselves. Table 6 reports the estimates from linear probability 
models on how the marginal tax rate (as a proxy for tax incentives) and the status of customer-
supplier relationships affect a firm’s decision to establish a tax haven subsidiary. 31  The 
dependent variable in columns 1 and 2, Tax haven subst+1, is an indicator variable that is equal to 
one if a firm has at least one subsidiary in a tax haven in year t+1.32 To reflect the establishment 
of tax haven subsidiaries in year t+1, in each specification we exclude observations where the 
                                                          
30 All the results are qualitatively unchanged if we use the alternative tax avoidance measures discussed in 
Section 4.2. 
31 Angrist and Pischke (2010) argue that the asymptotic properties and flexibility of linear models often produce 
more robust results than nonlinear models. In addition, linear models can accommodate large numbers of industry 
and year fixed effects, and coefficients on interaction terms in these models measure the marginal effects. 
Nevertheless, our results are robust to logit models. 
32  Essentially, we are comparing firm-years with tax-haven initiation in year t+1 and firm-years without, 
including firms that never have a haven and the non-initiation years for firms that ever have a haven. 
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dependent variable corresponding to year t is equal to one. 33  All independent variables, as 
defined in Appendix B, reflect information in year t. We control for industry and year fixed 
effects in all specifications. 
In Panel A of Table 6, results in column 1 suggest that principal customer firms and firms 
with higher marginal tax rates are more likely to establish subsidiaries in tax havens than other 
Compustat firms. This result is consistent with our finding in Table 5 that coordination with 
external parties is an essential element in the successful implementation of a tax haven strategy. 
More importantly, column 2 shows that principal customers with stronger tax incentives (i.e., 
higher marginal tax rates) in year t are more likely to establish subsidiaries in tax havens in year 
t+1 than principal customers with weaker tax incentives (i.e., lower marginal tax rates). Overall, 
our results in Panel A suggest that tax incentives and supply-chain status, both separately and 
jointly, affect how firms organize themselves.  
A possible concern is that the results in Panel A of Table 6 could be driven by unobserved 
common factors that co-determine marginal tax rates, supply-chain status, and tax avoidance 
strategies. To alleviate this concern, we replicate the tests in Panel A of Table 6 in a two-year 
period before and after two sets of tax regulation changes: the Check-the-Box (CTB) regulations 
in 1996, and the expiration of the American Jobs Creation Act (AJCA) repatriation tax holiday 
and the enactment of IRS repurchase regulations (i.e., IRS 2006-85 and IRS 2007-48). Previous 
studies, such as Altshuler and Grubert (2005) and Desai and Dharmapala (2009), suggest that, 
although the CTB regulations were intended to reduce firms’ administrative expenses, they had 
an unintended consequence of furthering tax avoidance through tax haven subsidiaries by 
establishing the so-called “hybrid entities.” Our results in Panel B of Table 6 suggest that the 
                                                          
33 This requirement rules out the possibility that our results are driven by the persistence of adopted tax haven 
strategies. Our results are robust if we require that a firm has no tax haven subsidiaries in a three-year period from 
year t-2 to year t. 
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joint effect of marginal tax rates and supply-chain status on the likelihood of establishing a tax 
haven subsidiary became much stronger after the CTB regulations were adopted. In addition, we 
take advantage of the 2006/2007 IRS repurchase regulations and the lapse of the repatriation tax 
holiday at the end of 2005, both of which shut down major channels through which profits 
accumulated in tax haven subsidiaries could be repatriated back to the U.S. with little or no tax 
cost.34 We observe the joint effect of marginal tax rates and supply-chain status on the likelihood 
of establishing a tax haven is much weaker after the expiration of the ACJA repatriation holiday 
and the enactment of the 2006/2007 IRS repurchase regulations. Both sets of tests suggest that 
incentives associated with supply-chain tax strategies appear to affect the organizational 
structure of firms. 
4.6. Tax planning and colocation choices of foreign subsidiaries in the supply chain   
We next examine the effect of customer-supplier tax planning on where dependent 
suppliers set up their subsidiaries. Specifically, we test whether dependent suppliers are more 
likely to set up foreign subsidiaries in the countries where their principal customers have 
subsidiaries, and specifically whether colocation is more likely when the principal customers’ 
subsidiary operates in a tax haven.   
For each year t between 1994 and 2009, we match all supplier firms with all possible 
foreign countries/regions identified in Dyreng and Lindsey (2009).35 We estimate the following 
linear probability model of supplier firms’ location choices of foreign subsidiaries: 
Supplier subsidiary = β1Customer subsidiary + β2(Customer subsidiary × Tax haven)  
+ β3Tax haven + ГX + Firm FE + Year FE + ε.          (2) 
where Supplier subsidiary is an indicator variable that is equal to one if a supplier operates a 
                                                          
34  For a description of the repurchase strategy to repatriate foreign earnings, see Johnston (2007). The 
repatriation tax holiday was in place for 2004 and 2005 under the American Jobs Creation Act.   
35 Thus, the total number of observations each year roughly equals the number of supplier firms multiplied by the 
number of foreign countries/regions identified in Dyreng and Lindsey (2009). 
24 
 
subsidiary in this country in year t, and zero otherwise; Customer subsidiary is an indicator 
variable that is equal to one if at least one of the principal customers of this supplier operates a 
subsidiary in this country in year t, and zero otherwise; Tax haven is an indicator variable that is 
equal to one if this country/region is defined as a tax haven in Dyreng and Lindsey (2009). The 
vector X represents the set of control variables related to country characteristics that attract 
foreign investment from U.S. firms, including the distance between the U.S. and the country 
(Log(Distance to USA)), local English literacy (English speaking), Gross Domestic Product per 
capita (Log(GDP per capita)), GDP growth rate (GDP growth rate), import growth rate (Import 
growth rate), inflation rate (Inflation rate), and labor force (Log(Labor population)). 36  We 
include firm and year fixed effects in all specifications. We predict both β1 and β2 in Eq. (2) to be 
positive. 
 Table 7 presents the results. In this test, we require that the supplier does not have a 
subsidiary in this country/region in year t–1. This sample selection rule ensures that our results 
are not driven by existing subsidiaries in tax havens. In other words, our results reflect suppliers’ 
decision to establish a new subsidiary in tax havens that host their customers’ subsidiaries. In all 
specifications, both the coefficient of Customer subsidiary and that of Customer subsidiary × 
Tax haven are positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. The results suggest that 
dependent supplier firms are more likely to set up subsidiaries in foreign countries/regions that 
host their customers’ subsidiaries. Further, the colocation effect is more pronounced if the 
foreign subsidiaries of the customer firms are located in tax havens. 
5. Conclusion 
Despite the important role of taxes in a wide range of corporate finance decisions, they 
have been largely ignored in the finance literature on customer-supplier relationships. Our study 
                                                          
36 Detailed definitions of these variables are also included in Appendix B. 
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fills this void by investigating the effect of customer-supplier relationships on tax avoidance, and 
whether taxes affect how customers and suppliers organize their firms. We find that both 
principal customer firms and dependent supplier firms have lower GAAP and cash effective tax 
rates than otherwise similar firms, consistent with close customer-supplier relationships 
facilitating tax avoidance. In addition, we find that tax haven strategies are one potential 
mechanism through which customer firms and supplier firms reduce their tax rates. Moreover, 
customer-supplier tax avoidance helps explain firms’ organizational decisions, both for principal 
customers and dependent suppliers. Our findings add to the corporate finance literature on the 
role of taxes in financial decision-making, and also have important implications for tax 




Appendix A. A list of dependent suppliers for Caterpillar. 
Year Suppliers Sales to Caterpillar (mil$) % Sales to Caterpillar in total sales 
1994 ATCHISON CASTING CORP 12.292 14.90% 
1994 DONALDSON CO INC 69.107 11.64% 
1994 NEW BASTION DEVELOPMENT INC 8.957 41.18% 
1994 RAYTECH CORP 26.818 16.00% 
1994 SCHWITZER INC 41.383 27.00% 
1994 TWIN DISC INC 18.355 13.00% 
1995 ATCHISON CASTING CORP 18.611 13.15% 
1995 DONALDSON CO INC 88.199 12.53% 
1995 NEW BASTION DEVELOPMENT INC 10.519 47.93% 
1995 RAYTECH CORP 24.85 14.00% 
1995 TWIN DISC INC 19.708 12.00% 
1996 DONALDSON CO INC 88.691 11.69% 
1996 NEW BASTION DEVELOPMENT INC 11.412 51.05% 
1996 RAYTECH CORP 32.652 15.00% 
1996 TWIN DISC INC 17.666 10.00% 
1997 DONALDSON CO INC 91.668 11.00% 
1997 NEW BASTION DEVELOPMENT INC 13.1 55.34% 
1997 RAYTECH CORP 32.827 14.00% 
1997 TWIN DISC INC 20.894 11.00% 
1998 ACTIVE POWER INC 0.156 17.05% 
1998 DONALDSON CO INC 103.438 11.00% 
1998 MORTON INDUSTRIAL GRP INC 119.445 79.00% 
1998 NEW BASTION DEVELOPMENT INC 14.589 56.39% 
1998 RAYTECH CORP 30.716 12.41% 
1999 ACTIVE POWER INC 0.408 38.97% 
1999 MORTON INDUSTRIAL GRP INC 107.468 49.00% 
1999 NEW BASTION DEVELOPMENT INC 12.868 57.22% 
1999 RAYTECH CORP 29.976 11.90% 
2000 ACTIVE POWER INC 4.677 96.00% 
2000 MORTON INDUSTRIAL GRP INC 147.779 53.00% 
2000 NEW BASTION DEVELOPMENT INC 15.368 61.00% 
2000 RAYTECH CORP 31.139 13.00% 
2001 A S V INC 8.914 17.80% 
2001 ACTIVE POWER INC 19.629 87.00% 
2001 RAYTECH CORP 28.148 13.99% 
2002 A S V INC 14.023 31.70% 
2002 ACTIVE POWER INC 10.91 81.00% 
2002 RAYTECH CORP 23.948 11.41% 
2002 TECHNOLOGY SOLUTIONS CO 14.779 16.00% 
2003 A S V INC 52.049 54.00% 
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2003 ACTIVE POWER INC 5.334 60.00% 
2003 TECHNOLOGY SOLUTIONS CO 5.02 11.00% 
2004 A S V INC 64.349 40.00% 
2004 ACTIVE POWER INC 8.523 54.00% 
2004 RAYTECH CORP 26.968 11.86% 
2004 WOODWARD INC 83.562 11.77% 
2005 A S V INC 95.582 39.00% 
2005 ACTIVE POWER INC 7.471 42.00% 
2005 WOODWARD INC 102.018 12.33% 
2006 A S V INC 81.225 33.00% 
2006 ACTIVE POWER INC 8.76 35.00% 
2006 HAWK CORP 36.049 17.00% 
2007 ACTIVE POWER INC 10.416 31.00% 
2007 COMMERCIAL VEHICLE GROUP INC 76.646 11.00% 
2007 HAWK CORP 38.192 16.70% 
2008 ACTIVE POWER INC 17.194 40.00% 
2008 COMMERCIAL VEHICLE GROUP INC 83.984 11.00% 
2008 HAWK CORP 51.503 19.10% 
2008 ORBCOMM INC 3.28 10.90% 
2008 WOODWARD INC 145.853 11.59% 
2009 ACTIVE POWER INC 9.675 24.00% 
2009 HAWK CORP 29.826 17.30% 





Appendix B. Variable definitions. 
 
Key tax variables  
GETR GAAP effective tax rate: TXT/(PI–SPI).  
 
CETR Cash effective tax rate: TXPD/(PI–SPI).  
 
MTR Simulated marginal tax rate after interest expense deduction, defined as the present 
value of taxes on an additional dollar of income (Graham and Mills, 2008). 
 
Key customer-supplier relationship variables 
Principal customer (PC) An indicator that takes the value of one if the firm is a principal customer. 
 
Dependent supplier (DS) An indicator that takes the value of one if the firm has at least one corporate 
principal customer (i.e., the firm is a dependent supplier). 
 
Tax haven subs An indicator that takes the value of one if a firm has at least one subsidiary in a tax 
haven as defined by Dyreng and Lindsey (2009). 
 
PC with tax haven subs An indicator that takes the value of one if a principal customer has at least one 
subsidiary in a tax haven as defined by Dyreng and Lindsey (2009). 
 
PC with no tax haven subs 
 
An indicator that takes the value of one if a principal customer does not have any 
subsidiary in a tax haven as defined by Dyreng and Lindsey (2009). 
 
DS with tax haven subs An indicator that takes the value of one if a dependent supplier has at least one 
subsidiary in a tax haven as defined by Dyreng and Lindsey (2009). 
 
DS with no tax haven subs An indicator that takes the value of one if a dependent supplier does not have any 
subsidiary in a tax haven as defined by Dyreng and Lindsey (2009). 
 
DS with tax haven subs & 
whose PC has tax haven subs 
 
An indicator that takes the value of one if a dependent supplier has at least one 
subsidiary in a tax haven and at least one of its principal customers is either 
incorporated in a tax haven or has at least one subsidiary in a tax haven, where tax 
havens are defined by Dyreng and Lindsey (2009). 
 
DS with tax haven subs & 
whose PC has no tax haven 
subs 
 
An indicator that takes the value of one if a dependent supplier has at least one 
subsidiary in a tax haven and none of its principal customers are incorporated in a 
tax haven nor have any subsidiary in a tax haven, where tax havens are defined by 
Dyreng and Lindsey (2009). 
 
DS with no tax haven subs & 
whose PC has tax haven subs 
 
An indicator that takes the value of one if a dependent supplier does not have any 
subsidiary in a tax haven but at least one of its principal customers is either 
incorporated in a tax haven or has at least one subsidiary in a tax haven, where tax 
havens are defined by Dyreng and Lindsey (2009). 
 
DS with no tax haven subs & 
whose PC has no tax haven 
subs 
An indicator that takes the value of one if a dependent supplier does not have any 
subsidiary in a tax haven and none of its principal customers are incorporated in a 
tax haven nor have any subsidiary in a tax haven, where tax havens are defined by 





Vertical integration An indicator variable that equals one if a firm has two business Segments A and B 
where the industry of Segment A contributes more than 10% in total input for the 
industry of Segment B according to BEA input-output tables.   
 
Government contractor An indicator variable that equals one if a firm has at least one government principal 
customer. 
 





Leverage Financial leverage at the end of the year, calculated as long-term debt (DLTT) scaled 
by total assets (AT). 
 
Foreign assets Foreign assets, estimated following Oler, Shevlin, and Wilson (2007). 
 
New investments New investment, calculated as Compustat (XRD+CAPX+AQC–SPPE–DPC), scaled 
by lagged total assets (AT). 
 
Property, plant, and equipment Net property, plant, and equipment at the end the year, calculated as Compustat 
PPENT scaled by lagged total assets (AT). 
 
Intangible assets Intangible assets at the end of the year, calculated as Compustat INTAN scaled by 
lagged total assets (AT). If INTAN = ‘C’, then INTAN = GDWL. 
 
Equity income in earnings Equity income in earnings, calculated as Compustat ESUB scaled by lagged total 
assets (AT). 
 
Firm size The natural logarithm of market value of equity at the beginning of the year, 
calculated as Compustat PRCC_F×CSHO. 
 
Market-to-book Market-to-book ratio at the beginning of the year, calculated as the market value of 
equity (Compustat PRCC_F×CSHO) divided by the book value of equity 
(Compustat CEQ). 
 
Abnormal accruals The absolute value of discretionary accruals, estimated from the performance-
adjusted modified cross-sectional Jones (1991) model. 
 
Cash holdings Cash holdings at the end of the year, calculated as Compustat CHE scaled by lagged 
total assets (AT).  
 
Delaware An indicator variable that is equal to one if a firm is incorporated in Delaware, and 
zero otherwise.  
 
Log(Distance to USA) The natural logarithm of the country’s distance to the U.S., according to an 
estimation using Google Maps. 
  
English speaking Percentage of English speaking population provided by Wikipedia 
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_English-speaking_population, 
sources of country-specific data are provided in the column “Comments” on the 
Wiki webpage). 
 
Log(GDP per capita) The natural logarithm of GDP per capita (based on 2005 U.S. Dollar) of a 
country/region, from World Bank’s “Countries and Economies” databank.   
 
GDP growth rate Annual GDP growth rate of a country/region, from World Bank’s “Countries and 
Economies” databank.   
 
Import growth rate Annual import growth rate of a country/region, from World Bank’s “Countries and 
Economies” databank.   
 
Inflation rate Annual inflation rate of a country/region based on consumer price index (CPI), from 
World Bank’s “Countries and Economies” databank.   
 
Log(Labor population) The natural logarithm of labor population of a country/region, from World Bank’s 
“Countries and Economies” databank.   
 
Other tax variables  
CETR5 Five-year cash ETR: TXPD/(PI–SPI). Both TXPD and (PI–SPI) are cumulated over 
five years before calculation. 
 




CTD Cash tax differential: TXPD–0.35*(PI–SPI), scaled by lagged total assets (AT). 
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Fig. 1. Caterpillar’s tax strategy. 
This figure illustrates the legal title chain for replacement parts in Caterpillar’s tax strategy. Caterpillar used its 
Swiss subsidiary, CSARL, as its global purchaser of replacement parts (U.S. Senate, 2014). In the figure, the arrows 
represent the legal title flow of the replacement parts. The factories represent third-party suppliers of replacement 
parts. The circles represent independently owned Caterpillar dealers, who in turn sell replacement parts to the end 
customers. According to the Senate report, over the period 2000–2012, Caterpillar shifted U.S. taxable income of 











This table provides sample distributions over years (Panel A) and across industries (Panel B). Our sample period 
is from 1994 to 2009. Our sample includes all Compustat firms after removing firm-years with negative pre-tax 
income or book value, with non-positive sales, with total assets of less than $1 million, or firms from the financial 
services and utilities industries. We also require that all information that we use to compute our key tax avoidance 
variables must be available from Compustat. 
 
Panel A: Sample distribution by year 
 
Year All firms Principal customers Dependent suppliers Other firms 
1994 2,595 336 879 1,448 
1995 2,691 338 957 1,472 
1996 2,847 368 1,081 1,488 
1997 2,943 334 1,107 1,596 
1998 2,881 300 1,031 1,627 
1999 3,002 322 814 1,924 
2000 2,843 347 983 1,607 
2001 2,363 292 814 1,342 
2002 2,507 308 888 1,395 
2003 2,644 345 918 1,475 
2004 2,852 393 1,008 1,566 
2005 2,776 369 980 1,537 
2006 2,735 355 1,003 1,485 
2007 2,537 338 932 1,371 
2008 2,180 282 835 1,160 
2009 2,169 262 667 1,303 






Panel B: Sample distribution by Fama-French 48 industry classification 
 
Industry All firms Principal customers Dependent suppliers Other firms 
Aircraft 314 77 180 83 
Agriculture 186 9 73 108 
Automobiles and Trucks 852 198 400 302 
Beer & Liquor 243 49 50 152 
Construction Materials 1,202 52 397 755 
Printing and Publishing 452 55 81 316 
Shipping Containers 142 12 70 64 
Business Services 5,036 257 1,678 3,162 
Chemicals 1,040 122 326 603 
Electronic Equipment 2,894 475 1,756 940 
Apparel 868 58 477 373 
Construction 559 20 134 407 
Coal 84 0 55 29 
Computers 1,666 354 763 677 
Pharmaceutical Products 1,418 346 728 514 
Electrical Equipment 678 65 239 389 
Energy 2,531 374 1,042 1,216 
Fabricated Products 216 2 97 119 
Food Products 1,106 134 467 560 
Entertainment 701 29 125 548 
Precious Metals 192 4 40 151 
Defense 110 30 70 18 
Healthcare 924 85 168 684 
Consumer Goods 927 114 373 496 
Measuring and Control Equipment 1,167 78 493 612 
Machinery 1,944 175 717 1,107 
Restaurants, Hotels, Motels 1,007 97 22 889 
Medical Equipment 1,442 173 551 752 
Non-Metallic and Industrial Metal Mining 313 9 85 220 
Miscellaneous 654 56 246 368 
Business Supplies 776 88 277 449 
Personal Services 510 24 46 440 
Retail 2,997 757 122 2,129 
Rubber and Plastic Products 546 17 266 270 
Shipbuilding, Railroad Equipment 101 8 53 41 
Tobacco Products 53 8 26 23 
Candy & Soda 133 11 45 79 
Steel Works 832 60 301 489 
Communication 1,311 220 194 905 
Recreation 424 60 253 139 
Transportation 1,567 157 606 830 
Textiles 248 16 134 101 
Wholesale 2,199 354 671 1,287 








This table reports the mean levels for key variables in our analyses. Our sample period is from 1994 to 2009, and 
Table 1 provides sample distributions over years and across industries. Our sample includes all Compustat firms 
after removing firm-years with negative pre-tax income or book value, with non-positive sales, with total assets of 
less than $1 million, or firms from the financial services and utilities industries. We also require that all information 
that we use to compute our key tax avoidance variables must be available from Compustat. Detailed definitions of 
all variables are provided in Appendix B. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 




suppliers Other firms 
GETR 0.295 0.310 0.278 0.302 
CETR 0.250 0.256 0.231 0.258 
MTR  0.290 0.326 0.279 0.291 
Vertical integration 0.031 0.076 0.021 0.028 
Government contractor 0.088 0.088 0.089 0.088 
ROA 0.122 0.125 0.128 0.118 
Leverage 0.157 0.172 0.138 0.165 
Foreign assets 0.194 0.282 0.219 0.166 
New investments 0.091 0.090 0.102 0.087 
Property, plant, and equipment 0.341 0.345 0.321 0.352 
Intangible assets 0.148 0.150 0.132 0.158 
Equity income in earnings 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
Firm size 5.761 8.322 5.287 5.614 
Market-to-book 2.910 3.758 2.933 2.761 
Abnormal accruals 0.066 0.049 0.074 0.064 
Cash holdings 0.179 0.146 0.221 0.163 
Delaware 0.485 0.531 0.530 0.453 





Status in customer-supplier relationships and its impact on effective tax rates. 
This table presents the estimates of OLS regressions of effective tax rates on the status of principal customers 
and dependent suppliers. The sample period is from 1994 to 2009, and Table 1 provides sample distributions over 
years and across industries. The dependent variable in column 1, GETR, is the GAAP effective tax rate. The 
dependent variable in column 2, CETR, is the cash effective tax rate. Detailed definitions of all variables are 
provided in Appendix B. We control for industry and year fixed effects in all specifications. The t-statistics in 
parentheses are based on standard errors clustered at both the firm and the year levels. The superscripts ***, **, and 
* indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels for two-tailed tests, respectively. 







-0.010***  -0.027*** 
  
(-2.73)  (-6.27) 
Dependent supplier  
 
-0.008***  -0.014*** 
  
(-2.86)  (-3.65) 
Vertical integration 
 
-0.013*  -0.013 
  
(-1.80)  (-1.25) 
Government contractor 
 
-0.004  -0.004 
  
(-1.00)  (-0.61) 
ROA 
 
0.350***  0.023 
 
 
(18.38)  (0.89) 
Leverage 
 
0.026**  -0.087*** 
 
 
(2.02)  (-6.78) 
Foreign assets 
 
-0.054***  -0.020** 
 
 
(-10.37)  (-2.32) 
New investments 
 
-0.006  0.024** 
 
 
(-0.61)  (2.32) 
Property, plant, and equipment 
 
-0.045***  -0.086*** 
 
 
(-9.17)  (-8.33) 
Intangible assets 
 
0.007  -0.025* 
 
 
(0.59)  (-1.77) 
Equity income in earnings 
 
-0.941***  -0.482 
 
 
(-3.43)  (-1.38) 
Firm size 
 
0.011***  0.012*** 
 
 
(6.97)  (9.38) 
Market-to-book 
 
-0.008***  -0.006*** 
 
 
(-10.80)  (-6.59) 
Abnormal accruals 
 
-0.198***  -0.071*** 
 
 
(-9.38)  (-3.44) 
Cash holdings 
 
-0.084***  -0.090*** 
 
 
(-11.38)  (-9.97) 
Delaware 
 
0.009**  -0.010*** 
 
 
(2.28)  (-2.77) 
Industry fixed effects Yes  Yes 












Customer-supplier relationships and alternative measures of tax avoidance. 
This table presents the estimates of robustness checks based on alternative measures of tax avoidance. The 
sample period is from 1994 to 2009, and Table 1 provides sample distributions over years and across industries. The 
specification of tests reported in this table is very similar to that reported in Table 3 while we replace effective tax 
rates with four alternative measures of tax avoidance. Detailed definitions of all dependent and independent 
variables are provided in Appendix B. We control for industry and year fixed effects in all specifications. The t-
statistics in parentheses are based on standard errors clustered at both the firm and the year levels. The superscripts 
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels for two-tailed tests, respectively.  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 CETR5 Cash ratio CTD Current ETR 
Principal customer -0.012** -0.028*** -0.003*** -0.019*** 
 (-2.44) (-8.30) (-2.58) (-5.40) 
Dependent supplier -0.015*** -0.008*** -0.003*** -0.010*** 
 (-3.94) (-3.13) (-4.58) (-3.57) 
Vertical integration 0.010 -0.013* -0.002 -0.003 
 (0.96) (-1.90) (-1.00) (-0.49) 
Government contractor 0.002 0.007 -0.000 -0.001 
 (0.35) (1.56) (-0.59) (-0.15) 
ROA -0.144*** 0.314*** -0.248*** 0.225*** 
 (-6.46) (15.72) (-24.96) (7.96) 
Leverage -0.103*** -0.078*** -0.030*** -0.072*** 
 (-7.86) (-10.27) (-13.48) (-5.39) 
Foreign assets -0.027*** -0.010* -0.010*** -0.016** 
 (-2.92) (-1.84) (-6.33) (-2.24) 
New investments -0.025* 0.066*** 0.007 0.012 
 (-1.96) (5.37) (1.34) (1.29) 
Property, plant, and equipment -0.088*** -0.131*** 0.005*** -0.102*** 
 (-9.13) (-20.22) (2.90) (-11.82) 
Intangible assets -0.016 -0.024** 0.002 -0.012 
 (-0.93) (-2.17) (0.71) (-1.15) 
Equity income in earnings -0.530* 0.274 0.035 -0.868*** 
 (-1.72) (1.19) (0.44) (-2.96) 
Firm size -0.000 0.010*** 0.000 0.015*** 
 (-0.12) (12.00) (0.04) (14.77) 
Market-to-book -0.003*** -0.003*** 0.003*** -0.006*** 
 (-4.42) (-4.39) (6.62) (-7.43) 
Abnormal accruals 0.013 0.103*** -0.028*** -0.121*** 
 (0.56) (5.03) (-3.75) (-10.40) 
Cash holdings -0.067*** -0.107*** 0.009*** -0.049*** 
 (-7.46) (-11.92) (4.06) (-5.71) 
Delaware -0.009** -0.005* -0.002** 0.003 
 (-2.42) (-1.88) (-2.30) (0.85) 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 37,462 48,438 60,840 47,054 






Status in customer-supplier relationships, use of subsidiaries in tax havens, and their impact on the effective tax rate. 
This table presents the estimates of OLS regressions of the GAAP effective tax rate (GETR) and the cash 
effective tax rate (CETR) on a firm’s status in customer-supplier relationships and its use of subsidiaries in tax 
havens. The sample period is from 1994 to 2009, and Table 1 provides sample distributions over years and across 
industries. The dependent variable in columns 1 and 2, GETR, is the GAAP effective tax rate. The dependent 
variable in columns 3 and 4, CETR, is the cash effective tax rate. Detailed definitions of all independent variables 
are provided in Appendix B. We control for industry and year fixed effects in all specifications. The t-statistics in 
parentheses are based on standard errors clustered at both the firm and the year levels. The superscripts ***, **, and 
* indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels for two-tailed tests, respectively. 
    (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
  GETR GETR  CETR CETR 
PC with tax haven subs  -0.024*** -0.024***  -0.044*** -0.044*** 
  (-4.76) (-4.71)  (-7.35) (-7.34) 
PC with no tax haven subs  0.000 0.000  -0.013** -0.013** 
  (0.09) (0.09)  (-2.14) (-2.14) 
DS with tax haven subs  -0.008***   -0.017***  
  (-2.59)   (-3.72)  
DS with no tax haven subs    -0.007*   -0.006  
  (-1.81)   (-1.18)  
DS with tax haven subs & whose PC has tax haven subs   -0.012***   -0.024*** 
   (-2.65)   (-3.77) 
DS with tax haven subs & whose PC has no tax haven subs   -0.007**   -0.015*** 
   (-2.11)   (-3.25) 
DS with no tax haven subs & whose PC has tax haven subs   -0.011*   -0.012* 
   (-1.92)   (-1.65) 
DS with no tax haven subs & whose PC has no tax haven subs   -0.004   -0.003 
   (-0.99)   (-0.48) 
Tax haven subs  0.006 0.005  -0.001 -0.001 
  (1.60) (1.61)  (-0.21) (-0.25) 
Vertical integration  -0.013* -0.013*  -0.013 -0.013 
  (-1.83) (-1.84)  (-1.27) (-1.28) 
Government contractor  -0.004 -0.004  -0.004 -0.004 
  (-0.90) (-0.91)  (-0.53) (-0.55) 
ROA  0.351*** 0.350***  0.023 0.022 
  (18.42) (18.32)  (0.90) (0.87) 
Leverage  0.025** 0.025*  -0.088*** -0.088*** 
  (1.97) (1.95)  (-6.81) (-6.82) 
Foreign assets  -0.055*** -0.056***  -0.020** -0.021** 
  (-10.42) (-10.49)  (-2.31) (-2.36) 
New investments  -0.006 -0.006  0.024** 0.025** 
  (-0.65) (-0.60)  (2.29) (2.36) 
Property, plant, and equipment  -0.045*** -0.045***  -0.087*** -0.087*** 
  (-9.13) (-9.12)  (-8.20) (-8.19) 
Intangible assets  0.007 0.007  -0.025* -0.025* 
  (0.60) (0.60)  (-1.80) (-1.80) 
Equity income in earnings  -0.916*** -0.917***  -0.438 -0.440 
  (-3.33) (-3.33)  (-1.24) (-1.24) 
Firm size  0.011*** 0.011***  0.012*** 0.012*** 
  (6.81) (6.88)  (8.75) (8.87) 
Market-to-book  -0.008*** -0.008***  -0.006*** -0.006*** 
  (-10.73) (-10.79)  (-6.48) (-6.51) 
Abnormal accruals  -0.198*** -0.198***  -0.071*** -0.071*** 
  (-9.35) (-9.35)  (-3.44) (-3.45) 
Cash holdings  -0.084*** -0.084***  -0.091*** -0.090*** 
  (-11.52) (-11.54)  (-10.14) (-10.11) 
Delaware  0.009** 0.009**  -0.010*** -0.010*** 
  (2.24) (2.26)  (-2.67) (-2.61) 
Industry fixed effects   Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Observations  47,054 47,054  42,565 42,565 




Marginal tax rates, customer-supplier relationships, and the decision to establish tax haven subsidiaries. 
This table reports the estimates from linear probability models on how the marginal tax rate and the status of 
customer-supplier relationship affect a firm’s decision to establish subsidiaries in tax havens. The sample period is 
from 1994 to 2009. In Panel A, the dependent variable, Tax haven subst+1, is an indicator variable that is equal to 
one if a firm has at least one subsidiary in a tax haven in year t+1. To ensure our results reflect initiations of tax 
haven strategies in year t+1, in each specification we exclude observations where the dependent variable 
corresponding to year t is equal to one. All independent variables, as defined in Appendix B, reflect information in 
year t. In Panel B, we repeat our tests in column 2 of Panel A in a two-year subsample before and after two sets of 
tax regulation changes: the Check-the-Box (CTB) regulations in 1996, and the expiration of the American Jobs 
Creation Act (AJCA) repatriation tax holiday and the enactment of IRS repurchase regulations (i.e., IRS 2006-85 
and IRS 2007-48). We control for both industry and year fixed effects in all specifications. The t-statistics in 
parentheses are based on standard errors clustered at both the firm level and the year level. The superscripts ***, **, 
and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels for two-tailed tests, respectively. 
Panel A: Basic results 
  Tax haven subst+1 
   (1) (2) 
Principal customer  0.149*** -0.553*** 
  (8.61) (-3.12) 
Principal customer × MTR   2.086*** 
   (3.81) 
Dependent supplier  0.006 0.007 
  (1.34) (1.37) 
MTR   0.108*** 0.075** 
  (3.11) (2.28) 
Vertical integration  -0.008 -0.009 
  (-0.36) (-0.42) 
Government contractor  -0.016*** -0.017*** 
  (-3.27) (-3.39) 
ROA  0.006 0.001 
  (0.20) (0.05) 
Leverage  0.066*** 0.066*** 
  (4.33) (4.31) 
Foreign assets  0.182*** 0.180*** 
  (10.15) (10.10) 
New investments  0.031* 0.034** 
  (1.90) (2.10) 
Property, plant, and equipment  -0.038*** -0.040*** 
  (-4.60) (-4.92) 
Intangible assets  0.018 0.016 
  (1.52) (1.43) 
Equity income in earnings  -0.700** -0.728** 
  (-2.07) (-2.21) 
Firm size  0.021*** 0.020*** 
  (10.56) (10.48) 
Market-to-book  -0.001 -0.001 
  (-1.46) (-1.52) 
Abnormal accruals  0.023 0.023 
  (0.95) (0.97) 
Cash holdings  0.016** 0.018** 
  (2.02) (2.21) 
Delaware  0.008 0.008 
  (1.39) (1.51) 
Industry fixed effect  Yes Yes 
Year fixed effect  Yes Yes 
Observations  19,421 19,421 





Panel B: Changes around two regulatory shocks 
(1) Before and after the Check-the-Box regulations  Tax haven subst+1 
     1994–1995    1997–1998 
Principal customer × MTR  0.053 3.531** 
  (1.36) (2.10) 
Diff(Principal customer × MTR)  3.478*** 
  (2.62) 
   
(2) Before and after IRS 2006-85 & IRS 2007-48  Tax haven subst+1 
     2004–2005    2008–2009 
Principal customer × MTR  2.571*** 0.484* 
  (5.03) (1.70) 
Diff(Principal customer × MTR)  -2.087** 






Colocation choices of foreign subsidiaries in the supply chain. 
This table reports the estimates from linear probability model regressions of suppliers’ colocation choices of 
foreign subsidiaries in tax havens where customers have subsidiaries. For each year t between 1994 and 2009, we 
match all supplier firms with all possible foreign countries/regions documented in Dyreng and Lindsey (2009). The 
dependent variable, Supplier subsidiary, is an indicator variable that is equal to one if a supplier operates a 
subsidiary in this country in year t, and zero otherwise. Customer subsidiary is an indicator variable that is equal to 
one if at least one of the principal customers of this supplier operates a subsidiary in this country in year t, and zero 
otherwise. Tax haven is an indicator variable that is equal to one if this country/region is defined as a tax haven in 
Dyreng and Lindsey (2009). Detailed definitions of all other variables are defined in Appendix B. We require that 
the supplier did not have a subsidiary in this country/region in year t–1. In this case, if Supplier subsidiary is equal 
to one in year t, it indicates a new establishment of subsidiary in the country in year t. We control for firm and year 
fixed effects in all specifications. The t-statistics in parentheses are based on standard errors clustered at the firm 
level. The superscripts ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels for two-tailed 
tests, respectively.  
 Supplier subsidiary 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Customer subsidiary 0.015*** 0.013*** 0.011*** 0.008*** 
 (27.95) (22.91) (20.30) (14.97) 
Tax haven 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.005*** 0.002*** 
 (13.26) (2.91) (23.65) (15.22) 
Customer subsidiary × Tax haven  0.013***  0.022*** 
  (16.50)  (19.69) 
Log(Distance to USA)   -0.000 -0.001*** 
   (-0.57) (-2.91) 
English speaking   0.002*** 0.002*** 
   (11.92) (12.25) 
Log(GDP per capita)   0.002*** 0.002*** 
   (21.68) (22.48) 
GDP growth rate   -0.001** -0.001*** 
   (-2.26) (-2.83) 
Import growth rate   -0.001*** -0.001*** 
   (-4.79) (-5.09) 
Inflation rate   -0.000*** -0.000*** 
   (-4.76) (-5.32) 
Log(Labor population)   0.002*** 0.002*** 
   (23.24) (23.50) 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 5,290,146 5,290,146 3,412,967 3,412,967 
Adjusted R-squared 0.019 0.019 0.031 0.032 
 
